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Security	and	Governance	in	the	Disputed	Territories
Under	a	Fractured	GOI:	The	Case	of	Northern	Diyala
by	Zmkan	Ali	Saleem,	Mac	Skelton	and	Christine	M.	van	den	Toorn
This	blog	was	originally	published	in	the	LSE	Middle	East	Centre	blogs.	You	can	find	out	more	about	the	Conflict
Research	Programme’s	work	in	Iraq	and	the	wider	Middle	East,	here.
A	conversation	between	two	Sons	of	Iraq.	Photo:	Herald	Post,	Flickr.
In	October	2017,	the	Kurdish	Regional	Government’s	(KRG)	political	and	military	hold	over	large	swaths	of	the
disputed	territories	evaporated	overnight.	A	mix	of	military	forces	and	militias	backed	by	the	Government	of	Iraq
(GOI)	overwhelmed	Kurdish	Peshmerga	forces,	quickly	taking	over	strategic	areas	of	Diyala,	Salahadin,	Ninawa,
and	Kirkuk.	While	legally	and	constitutionally	these	territories	remain	disputed,	in	actuality	the	KRG’s	political	and
military	influence	has	declined	dramatically	in	a	short	period	of	time,	leaving	the	GOI	and	its	affiliates	in	control.
What	are	the	implications	of	renewed	GOI	control?	What	does	this	shift	in	the	security	arrangement	tell	us	about
future	KRG–GOI	attempts	to	resolve	the	dispute	over	these	territories?
Preliminary	interviews	highlight	the	fact	that	the	nature	and	form	of	GOI	control	varies	considerably	across	the
disputed	territories.	The	campaign	against	ISIS	has	left	the	federal	government	with	a	fragmented	military	and
administrative	apparatus.	While	legally	speaking	the	state-backed	Popular	Mobilisation	Forces	(PMFs)	have	been
incorporated	into	the	federal	government	since	2016,	in	reality	the	different	factions	vary	greatly	in	their	command
structures,	priorities,	and	loyalty	to	the	GOI.	Thus,	instead	of	solely	a	KRG–GOI	conflict,	the	disputed	territories	face
a	varied	field	of	political	and	military	actors	vying	for	control.	This	fragmentation	of	public	authority	impacts	not	only
the	security	of	the	disputed	territories	but	also	the	provision	of	services	and	administration.	In	what	follows	we
provide	an	overview	of	these	dynamics	in	one	of	the	most	complex	of	the	disputed	areas,	northern	Diyala.	Future
outputs	will	examine	similar	features	in	Tuz	Khormatu,	Kirkuk	and	multiple	towns	in	Ninewa.
Khanaqin	District	Centre
The	Diyala	district	of	Khanaqin,	including	subdistricts	of	Jalawla	and	Saadiya,	is	an	ethnically	diverse	area	inhabited
by	Arabs,	Turkmen	and	a	large	Kurdish	population.	The	KRG	has	exerted	major	influence	over	the	area	since	2003
administratively	and	militarily,	particularly	in	the	city	centre	of	Khanaqin,	where	pro-KRG	Shia	Kurds	constitute	the
largest	portion	of	the	city’s	inhabitants.	During	much	of	the	post-2003	era,	both	the	Iraqi	government	and	KRG	were
funding	separate	administrative	entities.	The	KRG	directorates	of	municipality,	construction	and	development,	and
education	overlapped	with	federal	counterpart	administrative	entities.
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Neither	the	KRG	nor	the	federal	administrations	were	apolitical.	Since	2003,	both	key	KRG	and	GOI	functionaries
have	been	staffed	by	Kurdish	actors	loyal	to	political	parties,	especially	the	PUK.	The	GOI	reassertion	has	not
fundamentally	altered	this	arrangement,	in	part	due	to	the	PUK’s	longstanding	ties	to	Iran	as	well	as	Iranian-back
actors	in	Iraq	(such	as	the	Badr	Organisation,	the	largest	and	most	powerful	Iranian-backed	element	of	the	Shia
PMFs	in	Diyala,	led	by	Hadi	al-Ameri)	which	operate	in	the	area.	With	the	events	of	October	2017	and	the	assertion
of	GOI	control	over	the	local	security	apparatus,	federal	and	Badr	authorities	did	not	force	out	all	of	the	existing
Kurdish,	predominately	PUK	administration.	They	permitted	the	co-presence	of	KRG	and	GOI	administrations	for
the	provision	of	public	services.
The	current	distribution	of	administrative	power	is	by	no	means	equal	between	the	GOI	and	KRG,	however.	The
centre	of	political	control	has	shifted	towards	the	federal	ministries	and	the	governorate	capital	of	Ba’quba.	The
mayor’s	office	and	directors	now	execute	their	duties	with	the	knowledge	that	the	governorate	authorities	control	the
bulk	of	Khanaqin’s	salary	distributions.	Moreover,	federal	influence	over	Khanaqin’s	security	apparatus	allow
Ba’quba	to	hold	sway	over	the	administrative	reach	of	certain	KRG	entities.	A	senior	KRG	judge	described	the
marginalisation	of	the	Kurdish	courts:	“The	Diyala	governorate	took	measure	to	force	the	KRG	courts	out	of
Khanaqin	by	demanding	that	the	city’s	federal	police	chief	not	send	any	claims	to	Kurdish	judges.”	At	present,
federal	courts	run	by	Arab	judges	control	the	judiciary,	and	the	KRG	courts	have	relocated	to	PUK-controlled
territory.
Though	the	centre	of	power	has	shifted	to	the	provincial	government	in	Ba’quba,	federal	functionaries	in	Khanaqin
have	little	operating	support	from	the	office	of	the	governor	and	his	directors.	City	and	town	council	members
indicated	that	they	possess	neither	the	budget	nor	the	authority	to	propose	or	oversee	development	projects.
Reconstruction	funds	remain	meagre	from	both	the	regional	and	federal	governments,	and	they	have	largely	come
from	private	individuals	and	international	NGOs.
A	camp	for	internally	displaced	persons	(IDPs)	in	Khanaqin,	Iraq.	Source:	Josh	Zakary,	Flickr
This	lack	of	funds	for	public	works	has	generated	frustration	among	locals	in	light	of	the	fact	that	Khanaqin	is	rich	in
oil	and	cross	border	trade	revenues.	The	revenues	of	the	Paruezkhan	border	crossing	have	long	been	under	KRG
control,	and	this	has	not	changed	following	the	events	of	October	2017.	Control	over	the	high	traffic	Al-Mounzariah
border	crossing	is	now	in	the	hands	of	federal	authorities,	however,	tipping	the	balance	in	revenue	generation
towards	the	GOI.	As	a	general	point,	Khanaqin’s	Kurds	have	alleged	that	the	GOI	has	strategically	placed	loyal
Iraqi	Arab	functionaries	in	revenue	producing	institutions	such	as	Naftkhana	oil	fields	and	the	Al-Mounzariah	border
crossings	to	ensure	control	over	the	city’s	wealth.
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Security	is	shared	but	is	heavily	dominated	by	the	federal	authorities.	Since	October	2017,	the	Federal	Army	and
Badr	Organisation	forces	have	allowed	Kurdish	intelligence	&	security	forces	(Asayish)	to	stand	at	checkpoints,
though	they	have	been	stripped	of	the	authority	to	make	arrests.	The	arrangement,	which	Badr	and	the	PUK	struck
under	Iranian	influence,	aimed	to	appease	a	large	pro-KRG	Shia	Kurdish	population	concentrated	in	the	centre	of
Khanaqin	district.	(While	the	Shia	Kurds	of	Khanaqin	share	a	religious	sect	with	the	ruling	parties	in	Baghdad,	they
are	not	politically	aligned	with	them.)	This	population	has	felt	increasingly	vulnerable	between	2014	and	the	present,
in	large	part	due	to	the	significant	presence	of	Sunni	Arab	IDPs	in	the	district	who	fled	the	northern,	central,	and
southern	Sunni-populated	parts	of	Diyala	to	the	relative	safety	of	Khanaqin	after	the	rise	of	ISIS.
Locals	see	the	problem	with	the	diminished	Kurdish	security	presence	as	a	matter	of	capacity.		The	GOI	and	Badr
have	not	adequately	distributed	their	own	forces	to	the	area,	leaving	the	local	Kurds	and	police	alike	fearful	of
attacks	from	insurgent	groups	still	active	in	Khanaqin’s	nearby	areas.	A	high-ranking	official	in	the	Khanaqin	police
force	stated:	‘Now	that	the	Peshmerga	and	Kurdish	security	forces	are	no	longer	here	to	provide	security	and
protection,	the	doors	of	the	district	are	wide	open	for	radicals	and	terrorists	to	come	in	and	carry	out	attacks	and
terrorise	the	population.’
Allowing	the	Kurdish	security	apparatus	to	have	more	equal	footing	with	Badr	and	GOI	troops	through	continued
PUK–Badr	and	KRG–GOI	talks	might	help	reduce	the	risk	of	such	threats,	or	at	very	least	assuage	local	fears	of
violence.	This	perception	is	not	limited	to	the	Kurdish	inhabitants	of	Khanaqin.	Interviews	conducted	in	September
2018	with	Arab,	Turkmen,	and	Kurdish	members	of	the	city’s	council	confirmed	a	consensus	that	security	has
become	more	fragile	in	the	post-referendum	era.
Jalawla
Jalawla,	a	town	west	of	Khanaqin,	has	historically	held	a	large	Kurdish	population.	This	number	dwindled	during	the
violence	and	instability	of	the	post-2003	era,	as	extremist	groups	targeted	Kurdish	and	Turkmen	ethnicities.	Many
Kurds	fled	for	safer	places	like	Khanaqin,	and	the	trend	only	intensified	with	the	rise	of	ISIS	and	the	subsequent
struggle	to	retake	the	city.	Up	until	2014,	the	demographic	makeup	of	the	town	was	60%	Arab,	35%	Kurd,	and	5%
Turkmen.	With	the	displacements	after	the	rise	of	ISIS	and	later	the	referendum,	currently	the	distribution	is	roughly
85%	Arab,	10%	Kurd,	and	5%	Turkmen.	Of	the	Kurds	who	fled	Jalawla	following	the	events	of	October	2017,	many
of	those	who	have	yet	to	return	are	affiliates	of	the	Kurdish	security	apparatus.
During	the	first	decade	of	the	post-2003	period,	Kurdish	security	forces	were	not	in	control	of	Jalawla	though	there
were	PUK	security	forces	in	the	subdistrict	to	project	the	party’s	headquarters.	The	Iraqi	Army	and	federal	police
served	as	the	main	forces	on	the	ground.	When	the	federal	army	withdrew	from	Jalawla	in	the	face	of	ISIS	in	2014,
the	Peshmerga	and	Badr	clashed	with	ISIS	forces	starting	in	June	2014	and	continuing	for	four	months.	Finally,	in	a
joint	operation,	the	joint	security	force	overtook	Jalawla	in	November	2014.	A	deal	between	the	PUK	and	Badr
stipulated	that	Kurdish	forces	were	to	be	granted	control	over	Jalawla	while	Badr	would	have	jurisdiction	over
nearby	Saadiya	whenever	the	towns	were	liberated.
As	the	Peshmerga	solidified	a	presence	in	the	town	between	late	2014	until	October	2017,	they	levelled
accusations	against	segments	of	Jalawla’s	Sunni	Arab	population	of	having	sided	with	ISIS.	These	accusations
were	mostly	directed	towards	members	of	the	local	Karawi	tribe,	who	have	been	opposed	to	a	Kurdish	presence	in
the	town	for	decades.	Both	Karawi	and	non-Karawi	Sunni	Arab	returnees	claim	that	they	were	not	allowed	access
to	their	homes	on	account	of	this	blanket	accusation,	according	to	Sunni	Arab	members	of	the	AAH.	A	significant
portion	of	the	population	did	return,	however,	and	local	actors	such	as	the	director,	Shaykh	Yacoub	al	Lheibi,	and
several	major	INGOs	contributed	to	reconstruction	efforts	during	this	period.
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A	peshmerga	soldier	in	Diyala	province,	late	2014.	Source:	Publisagmo
The	2017	referendum	resulted	in	the	expulsion	of	the	Peshmerga	and	the	arrival	of	government-backed	Badr	and
Asaib	Ahl	Al	Haq	(AAH)	to	Jalawla.	The	AAH,	a	pro-Iran	militia	accused	of	committing	anti-Sunni	atrocities	in	other
parts	of	Iraq,	took	advantage	of	the	Karawis’	growing	animosity	towards	the	Kurds	in	order	to	bring	a	portion	of	the
Sunni	Arab	locals	into	its	ranks.	Sunni	Arab	AAH	now	patrol	the	area.	A	Sunni	Arab	member	of	the	AAH	explained
his	decision:	‘Look,	the	Kurdish	forces	harmed	Jalawla	and	its	Arab	residents.	They	applied	strict	security	measures
and	were	making	it	very	difficult	for	the	Arab	IDPs	to	return	to	the	town.’
Our	field	visits	to	Jalawla	suggest	that	the	Sunni	Arab	participation	in	the	AAH	has	by	no	means	put	them	on	equal
footing	with	the	Shia	Arab	leadership.	One	of	our	field	researchers	personally	witnessed	a	heated	interaction	where
a	Shia	AAH	commander	aggressively	insulted	a	group	of	local	Sunni	Arab	AAH	members,	prompting	one	of	the
Sunni	Arab	recruits	to	plead,	‘You	can’t	just	treat	us	as	if	we’re	nothing.’
According	to	a	Jalawla	government	official,	the	awkward	alliance	between	Sunni	Arabs	and	AAH	has	led	to	the
marginalisation	and	endangerment	of	the	Kurdish	population.	He	said,	‘I	don’t	go	outside	of	my	house	much,	for
fear	of	my	life.’	The	Federal	army	and	police	have	little	authority	amidst	this	AAH	and	Badr-dominated	security
landscape	in	Jalawla.
On	the	administrative	side,	neither	the	governor	of	Diyala,	nor	the	officials	in	Baghdad,	have	challenged	the
emerging	power	players	in	Jalawla.	Some	local	administrative	officials	claim	that	this	is	because	the	governor	and
some	on	the	provincial	council	are	beholden	to	Iranian	interests	in	the	province.	They	simply	cannot	challenge	the
presence	of	groups	like	AAH.	This	fragmentation	and	layering	of	public	authority	has	resulted	in	a	lack	of	services
and	public	works,	paralysing	government	institutions.	One	official	stated	that	money	from	the	local	government	in
Diyala	was	dedicated	for	three	projects	in	Jalawla	including	the	Salam	Water	project,	a	sport	club	and	a	dual
carriageway.	He	noted,	‘The	three	projects	remained	on	paper	only	and	politicians	in	the	local	government	in
Ba’quba	stole	the	funds	for	these	projects.’	Jalawla	claims	to	have	not	received	funds	from	the	government	for	the
reconstruction	efforts,	but	some	money	has	been	raised	from	donors	and	from	INGOs,	particularly	Oxfam.
The	crisis	in	public	authority	in	Jalawla	is	unlikely	to	change	without	decisive	GOI	intervention	if	only	because	of	the
sheer	amount	of	money	at	stake	in	maintaining	the	status	quo.	PMUs,	and	particularly	the	AAH,	generate	enormous
cash	flows	in	Jalawla.	For	instance,	the	AAH	collects	money	through	illegal	taxing	of	trucks	carrying	trading	goods
from	the	KRI	to	the	rest	of	Iraq.	The	AAH	man	checkpoints	on	commercially	strategic	roads	and	impose	taxes	on
vehicles	passing	through,	earning	an	estimated	amount	of	$300,000	daily	through	checkpoint	fees	across	Jalawla,
according	to	a	government	official.	This	has	helped	the	AAH	to	widen	its	networks	of	patronage	in	the	area.	The
Shia	militia	party	has	used	illegal	taxation	to	pay	the	salaries	of	its	fighters	and	followers,	thus	shifting	the	political
marketplace	in	its	favour.
Conclusion
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The	above	case	study	of	northern	Diyala	has	revealed	some	of	the	emerging	dynamics	of	governance	and	security
in	the	disputed	territories	since	the	October	2017	GOI	takeover.	The	nature	and	form	of	this	reassertion	of	federal
control	is	distinct	in	each	locality.	As	the	data	indicates,	the	layering	and	fragmentation	of	public	authority	presents
enormous	obstacles	to	the	effective	provision	of	services	and	security.	Forthcoming	interviews	and	data	collection
will	reveal	a	detailed	picture	of	these	evolving	political	and	security	realities	across	a	broader	geographic	scope,
including	the	disputed	areas	of	Salahadin,	the	Ninewa	Plains	and	Kirkuk.	Findings	will	be	published	in	a	December
2018	report,	which	will	include	recommendations	for	policy-makers.
Note:	All	unattributed	quotes	are	from	interviews	conducted	by	the	authors	in	August–October	2018.	Those
interviewed	included	officials	in	Khanaqin,	Sunni	Arab	members	of	the	AAH	in	Jalawla,	and	government	officials	in
Jalawla.
*This	blogpost	is	part	of	the	LSE	research	project	Public	Authority	and	Iraq’s	Disputed	Territories	led	by	Christine
van	den	Toorn,	examining	the	territorial	dispute	between	the	Government	of	Iraq	and	the	Kurdistan	Regional
Government.	This	project	forms	part	of	the	Conflict	Research	Programme,	funded	by	the	UK	Department	for
International	Development	to	provide	research	and	policy	advice	on	how	the	risk	and	impact	of	violent	conflict	might
be	more	effectively	reduced	through	development	and	governance	interventions.
The	CRP	blogs	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	the	Conflict	Research	Programme,	the	London
School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	or	the	UK	Government.
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